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Protections for ERISA Self-Insured Employee Welfare Benefit Plan
Participants: New Possibilities for State Action in the Event of Plan Failure
Abstract
Employees who receive health benefits through ERISA self-insured plans need protection when self-insured
plans fail. Because of the breadth of ERISA preemption, states have been unable to assess ERISA self-insured
plans for contribution to state insurance guaranty funds, and thus have been unable to include those
employees in the protection of those funds. Further, attempts at federal reform to protect these employees
have failed to garner support. However, under the recent Travelers, United Wire, and Safeco decisions, it may
be possible for states to assess ERISA self-insured funds and their participants through a combination of
hospital use surcharges and taxes on the sale of stop-loss insurance for contribution to state insurance
guaranty funds. This Comment explores ERISA preemption analysis in light of these recent cases, and
suggests state reforms to protect plan participants in the event of plan failure. Part II explores ERISA
preemption analysis in greater depth. Part III examines recent cases that have created new possibilities for
state health care reform by limiting the scope of ERISA preemption. Part IV proposes state reforms to protect
participants in selfinsured plans in the event of plan failure. Specifically, this Comment proposes that through
a combination of surcharges on hospital use and taxes on the sale of stop-loss insurance, states can act within
the bounds of ERISA preemption to include self-insured health plan participants in the protection of state
insurance guaranty funds. Copyright 2010 by The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System;
Reprinted by permission of the Wisconsin Law Review.
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PROTECTIONS FOR ERISA SELF-INSURED EMPLOYEE
WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN PARTICIPANTS:
NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR STATE ACTION
IN THE EVENT OF PLAN FAILURE
MARK ALAN EDWARDS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA)' to protect employees by securing their employee benefit
plans.2 Specifically, Congress sought to provide a uniform set of laws
and protections that would preempt dozens of often conflicting state laws
that "relate to" employee benefit plans.' In enacting ERISA, Congress
was chiefly concerned with "abuse and mismanagement in the private
pension system." 4 Although its substantive requirements are primarily
directed toward retirement pension plans (as indicated in the Act's title),
ERISA governs all employee welfare plans, including employee health
benefit plans. 5
* B.A., University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1992; J.D., University of
Wisconsin Law School, Class of 1998. With thanks to Kate and Alun, for their incredible
love and patience.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
2. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983); see also ERISA
§ 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
3. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
4. BARBARA J. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT I (4th ed. 1993).
5. ERISA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a). ERISA mandates reporting, disclosure,
participation, vesting, funding, and fiduciary requirements for employee benefit plans.
However, the participation, vesting, and funding requirements do not apply to employee
welfare (health) benefit plans. See ERISA §§ 101, 201, 301, 401, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021,
1051, 1081, 1101. Employee welfare plans governed by ERISA are those that pay the
following benefits through insurance: medical, hospital, or surgical care; and benefits paid
upon death, accident, disability, or sickness. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
However, the following plans are not governed by ERISA: government plans; church
plans; plans which receive no contributions from employers of participants; and plans
maintained solely to comply with workers' compensation, unemployment compensation,
or disability insurance laws. ERISA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. §1003(a).
HeinOnline -- 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 351 1997
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
ERISA preempts state laws that "relate to" employee health benefit
plans.' However, "any law of any State which regulates insurance,
banking, or securities" is saved from preemption.' Thus while states
may not regulate employee health benefit plans directly, they may do so
indirectly by regulating insurance companies and insurance contracts
purchased by those plans." However, an employee welfare benefit plan
that is self-insured-in other words, that does not purchase outside
insurance to cover its plan-may not be deemed an insurance company for
purposes of state regulation.'
Self-insured plans thus are exempt from state regulation. Yet ERISA
provides participants in self-insured employee health benefit plans little
protection in the event of plan failure."0 ERISA did create the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), funded primarily through
mandatory premiums paid by private pension plans. The PBGC provides
employee pension plan participants with some of their expected basic
benefits (usually those already vested) in the event of pension plan
failure." But ERISA created no such guaranty for employee welfare
plan participants, including employee health plan participants. Moreover,
it imposed no minimum funding requirement for employee welfare plans.
Self-insured employee welfare benefit plans thus are more susceptible to
plan failure.'
Like many states, Wisconsin maintains an insurance guaranty fund
in order to pay outstanding health care bills when insurance company
6. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
7. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. 1144(b)(2)(A).
8. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990).
9. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
10. Under ERISA §§ 502(a)(2),(3), 29 U.S.C. 1132 (a)(2), (3) plan participants
or their beneficiaries are authorized to sue plan fiduciaries for breach of fiduciary duties
under § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. 1109(a) if losses result from imprudent action by fiduciaries.
Until very recently, however, any recovery from such actions flowed to the plan rather
than to the participant or beneficiary who brought suit. See Massachusetts Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). But see Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996).
11. ERISA § 4002, 29 U.S.C. § 1302.
12. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners has recently warned
that due to the lack of-minimum funding requirements and the inability of states to
monitor them, participants in self-insured plans have far fewer protections than
participants in insurance company plans. Robert Pear, State Regulators Seek Power over
Self-Insured Employers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1994, at B7. As Fred C. Nepple, chief
counsel of the Wisconsin Office of the Insurance Commissioner has warned, "The
administrators of these plans know we cannot audit them or review their files .... We
... have no authority." Id; see also David J. Brummond, Federal Preemption of State
Insurance Regulation Under ERISA, 62 IOWA L. REV. 57, 117 n.474 (1976) (noting that
state regulators are concerned that with the absence of minimum funding requirements for
self-insured plans "inadequate amounts of money will be set aside to pay benefit claims").
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plans fail.13 The fund is maintained through taxes and surcharges
collected from insurance company plans and their participants."' ERISA
does not preempt these taxes and surcharges because they regulate
insurance." Self-insured plans are regulated differently. 6  Because
participants in self-insured plans do not contribute to state insurance
guaranty funds, they are not covered in the event of plan failure.1
7
When self-insured plans fail, participants are left unexpectedly to cover
their own unpaid health care bills. For example, a Wisconsin
manufacturer's self-insured employee health benefit plan recently failed.
Its employees were unexpectedly saddled with thousands of dollars in
unpaid health care bills.'8 The participants' health care provider faced
a difficult choice: they could pursue their patients for payment, or forgive
the unpaid bills and distribute the loss to other employers and patients
through higher fees. 9
The scope of ERISA preemption has been limited, however, by
recent decisions in the United States Supreme Courtz' and three courts
of appeals.2' These decisions have created new possibilities for states
13. WIS. STAT. § 646 (1995-1996); see also ALA. CODE § 27-44-3 (1975); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 23-96-107 (Michie 1995); CAL. INS. CODE § 1067.02 (West 1995-96);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-20-104 (1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-860 (West
1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 4403 (1996); D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1942 (1995-96);
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-38-2 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:16-203 (1996); 215 ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 1065.80-3 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3003 (1995); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 61B.19 (West 1996); Miss. CODE ANN. 83-23-205 (1972); Mo. CODE
ANN. § 376.717 (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-10-201 (1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 408-B:5 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:32A-3 (West 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE §
26.1-38.1-01 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3956.04 (Baldwin 1996); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 36, § 2025 (West 1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 991.1703 (West 1996); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 27-34.3-3 (1956); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-29C-3 (1997); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4153 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-1700 (Michie 1996); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 48.32A.020 (West 1996); W. VA. CODE § 33-26A-3 (1966).
14. WIS. STAT. § 646 (1995-1996).
15. See, e.g., New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1680 (1995) [hereinafter Travelers 1); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
16. See, e.g., General Split Corp. v. Mitchell, 523 F. Supp. 427, 430-31 (E.D.
Wis. 1981).
17. WIs. STAT. § 646.01(b)(9) (1995-1996).
18. Interview with Robert Richards, Director of Patient Advocacy, and Jeanan
Yasiri, Manager of Community Services, Dean Medical Center, in Madison, Wis. (1995).
19. Id.
20. See Travelers 1, 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
21. See Travelers Ins. Co. v Pataki, 63 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter
Travelers llJ; Safeco Life Ins. Co. v. Musser, 65 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 1995); United Wire,
Metal and Mach. Health and Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 995 F.2d
1179 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 944 (1993).
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to provide protection to self-insured plan participants while fostering a
more competitive health care market. These rulings may authorize states
to collect contributions to state insurance guaranty funds through
surcharges on hospital use by self-insured plan participants,2 and by
taxes on the sale of stop-loss insurance to self-insured plans.' Because
self-insured plans may now be forced to contribute to state insurance
guaranty funds, plan participants may be covered by the state insurance
guaranty funds when self-insured plans fail.
This Comment explores ERISA preemption analysis in light of these
recent cases, and suggests state reforms to protect plan participants in the
event of plan failure. Part II explores ERISA preemption analysis in
greater depth. Part III examines recent cases that have created new
possibilities for state health care reform by limiting the scope of ERISA
preemption. Part IV proposes state reforms to protect participants in self-
insured plans in the event of plan failure. Specifically, this Comment
proposes that through a combination of surcharges on hospital use and
taxes on the sale of stop-loss insurance, states can act within the bounds
of ERISA preemption to include self-insured health plan participants in
the protection of state insurance guaranty funds.
II. ERISA PREEMPTION
A. ERISA's Three Step Preemption Analysis
Courts apply a three-step analysis to determine whether ERISA
preempts state law causes of action against and state regulation of
employee welfare benefit plans.24 First, they apply ERISA's preemption
22. Travelers 11, 63 F.3d at 89.
23. Safeco, 65 F.3d at 647. Stop-loss insurance is a form of catastrophic
insurance purchased by otherwise self-insured plans. If claims against the plan exceed
plan assets, stop-loss insurance is used to pay those excess claims. The majority of
appellate courts agree that the purchase of stop-loss insurance by self-insured plans does
not negate the plan's self-insured status. See Thompson v. Talquin Build. Prods., 928
F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 1991); Brown v. Granatelli, 897 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 848 (1990); United Food & Commercial Workers and Employers Ariz.
Health & Welfare Trust v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1986); Moore v. Provident
Life and Accident Ins. Co., 786 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1986). But see Northern Group
Servs., Inc., v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub
nom. Northern Group Servs., Inc: v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 486 U.S. 1017
(1988); Michigan United Food & Commercial Workers Unions v. Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d
308 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986). See generally Jeffrey G.
Lenhart, ERISA Preemption: The Effect of Stop-Loss Insurance on Self-Insured Health
Plans, 14 VA. TAX REV. 615 (1995).
24. Lenhart, supra note 23, at 619.
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clause, section 514(a). The clause preempts a state law if it "relate[s]
to" an ERISA covered employee benefit plan. If the state law does not
relate to an ERISA employee benefit plan, it is not preempted, and steps
two and three are unnecessary.' If a state law does relate to an ERISA
plan within the meaning of the preemption clause, the second step is to
apply the "savings" clause, ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A).27 A state law that
would otherwise be preempted because it relates to an ERISA plan is
saved from preemption if the law regulates the insurance industry.'
Thus states retain their traditional power to regulate the insurance
industry,' even if that regulation ultimately relates to an ERISA plan.
Step three qualifies the savings clause by applying the "deemer"
clause, ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B). ° The deemer clause states that a self-
insured plan may not be deemed an insurance organization for the
purposes of state regulation. Thus, a law that relates to an ERISA plan
but is saved from preemption because it regulates insurance is nonetheless
preempted by the deemer clause as applied to self-insured plans.
Not surprisingly, much litigation has arisen regarding the
interpretation of each of the three steps. As the Supreme Court has wryly
noted, the preemption sections of ERISA are "not a model of legislative
drafting .... while Congress occasionally decides to return to the States
what it has previously taken away, it does not normally do both at the
same time."31 Alas, the Court's ERISA preemption jurisprudence is also
not a model of judicial reasoning. The next section explores in greater
detail how the Court applies these steps.
1. PREEMPTION
ERISA § 514(a) preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."32 A state
law relates to a benefit plan "if it has a connection with or reference to
such a plan."33 Courts have interpreted this standard quite broadly,
25. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
26. Travelers 11, 63 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1995).
27. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
28. id.
29. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, states retain their power to
regulate "the business of insurance" and no federal law may preempt that power without
specifically stating its intention to do so. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994). The "savings
clause" reaffirms that power. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
30. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
31. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739-40 (1985).
32. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
33. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
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particularly as applied to causes of action brought under state law by plan
participants or their beneficiaries.' The parade of ERISA preemption.
horribles is long and familiar. 5 Causes of action brought by participants
under state law which have been preempted include wrongful death,36
wrongful discharge," unfair claims denials,3" misrepresentation,39
breach of contract,' negligence, 4' infliction of emotional distress,42
unfair insurance practices,' breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing," breach of statutory duties,4' tortious interference,' bad
faith,4 breach of fiduciary duties," fraud,49 and conspiracy to
defraud.' Several frustrated courts have noted the devastating impact
of ERISA preemption on the ability of self-insured plan participants to
obtain their reasonable benefits expectations. 5
34. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990) ("The pre-emption clause
is conspicuous for its breadth.").
35. See Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Participants'
Rights by Expanding the Federal Common Law of ERISA, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 671 (1994).
36. See Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
37. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
38. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
39. See Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1989).
40. See Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1045 (1994).
41. See Greany v. Western Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 812 (9th Cir.
1992).
42. See Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 780 F.2d 419, (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
43. See Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302-03.
47. Tomczyk v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 715 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Wis. 1989),
aff'd, 951 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 940 (1992).
48. Davidian v. Southern California Meat Cutters Union, 859 F.2d 134 (9th. Cir.
1988).
49. Johnson v. District 2 Marine Eng. Beneficial Ass'n, 857 F.2d 514 (9th Cir.
1988).
50. Jelicic v. Hartford Ins. Co., 917 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 839 (1991).
51. See, e.g., Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 1993)
(Hutchinson, J., dissenting) ("The feeling of unfairness is palpable."); Sanson v. General
Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618, 623, 625 (11th Cir. 1992) (Birch, J., dissenting) ("An
employer in this circuit can now hoodwink a long time employee and leave him stranded
without any recourse whatsoever .... obviously the Supreme Court needs to do some
serious bushhogging in the ERISA preemption thicket."), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984
(1993); Olson v. General Dynamics Corp., 960 F.2d 1418, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1991)
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Perhaps the clearest example of the stunning breadth of ERISA
preemption of state law causes of action is revealed in Ingersoll-Rand Co.
v. McClendon.52 In Ingersoll-Rand, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that ERISA preempts employee wrongful discharge claims in which
an employee alleges that the discharge was motivated by the employer's
desire to avoid making contributions to the employee's ERISA-covered
pension fund.53 The Court reasoned that in order to determine the
veracity of the employee's allegations it must determine whether an
ERISA-covered pension fund existed. 4 Because the state cause of action
forced the Court to acknowledge the existence of the plan, the state cause
of action related to an ERISA plan, and was therefore preempted.55
Further, the Court noted that preemption can be triggered even if the state
law in question is not designed to affect ERISA plans, affects them only
indirectly, or is consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements.
Direct-and to some extent, indirect-state regulation of ERISA plans
is also preempted. Courts have found that ERISA preempts laws that
"provide an alternative cause of action to employees to collect benefits
protected by ERISA, [which] refer specifically to ERISA plans and apply
solely to them, or interfere with the calculation of benefits owed to an
employee."' 7 For example, in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,-" the
Supreme Court ruled that the New York Human Rights Law, which
forbade employment discrimination based on pregnancy and mandated that
employers offer disability benefits for pregnancy, had "a connection" to
employee benefits plans, and therefore was related to such plans.59 The
Court concluded that ERISA preempted the law "insofar as it prohibits
practices that are lawful under federal law."' In other words, as long
as the state law sought to prevent employee benefits discrimination not
unlawful under federal law, ERISA preempted it.
While the scope of ERISA's preemption is broad, there are some
limitations to its reach. But the courts have been unclear about where
(Reinhardt, J., concurring) ("[A] statute designed to safeguard employee retirement
benefits has, all too frequently, been used to deprive employees of rights they previously
enjoyed under state law while failing to provide any comparable federal remedy. "), cert.
denied, 504 U.S. 986 (1992).
52. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
53. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 145.
54. Id. at 140.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 139 (citing Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739.
57. AETNA Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1990).
58. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
59. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96.
60. Id. at 108.
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those boundaries lie.6 Courts have concocted a host of nebulous tests
and have applied them inconsistently. For example, ERISA does not
always preempt state laws that are "of general application-often
traditional exercises of state power or regulatory authority-whose effect
on ERISA plans is incidental," 62 or whose impact on an ERISA-covered
plan is "tenuous, remote, or peripheral."' Rather, preemption is
triggered by "an effect on the primary administrative functions of benefit
plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and the
amount of that benefit."' Thus ERISA does not preempt state laws
requiring companies to make lump-sum severance payments when closing
a plant,' laws prescribing what hospitals can charge (and thereby
preventing plans from negotiating their own rates with the hospitals),'
laws imposing a city income tax of general application that affects
employee contributions to benefit plans,67 and general escheat laws."
In Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.,' the
Supreme Court found that ERISA preempted a Georgia statute that singled
out ERISA welfare plan benefits for protective treatment under state
garnishment procedures.' However, ERISA did not forbid the
garnishment of welfare benefits even where the purpose of the
garnishments was to collect judgments against plan participants.7 In
other words, neither state nor federal law protected plan benefits from
garnishment. The Court held that since ERISA expressly bars the
garnishment of pension benefit plans, but is silent on the matter of
garnishment of welfare benefit plans, "Congress did not intend to
preclude state-law attachment of ERISA welfare plan benefits."'
This reasoning reveals more the breadth than the limits of ERISA
preemption; one can infer that actions against welfare benefit plans are
not barred only where Congress has been silent with regard to such
actions while explicitly barring actions against ERISA pension plans. Had
61. As more than one confused court has understated, "the distinction between
state laws that 'relate to' employee benefit plans and those that have only a 'tenuous,
remote, or peripheral' impact is not always clear." AETNA, 869 F.2d at 145.
62. Id. at 146.
63. Id. at 145 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21).
64. Id. at 146-47.
65. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
66. See Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133 (6th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 472 U.S.
1008.
67. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550 (6th Cir. 1987).
68. AETNA, 869 F.2d at 147.
69. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
70. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829.
71. id. at 832.
72. Id. at 838.
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Congress been completely silent, the Court would have presumed
preemption of the cause of action against both types of ERISA plans.7 3
Writing in dissent, Justice Kennedy argued that the breadth of ERISA's
preemption clause mandates the presumption that it preempts the
garnishment laws as applied to ERISA employee benefit plans. He
reasoned that these laws related to the plans by subjecting them to
administrative burdens.74
The only thing undeniably clear about ERISA's preemption clause is
its breadth. The clause preempts all state law causes of action. It also
preempts all direct state regulations of ERISA plans-regulations which
affect the structure, administration, or benefits offered; have a connection
or reference to ERISA plans; provide an alternate cause of action to
employees to collect benefits provided by ERISA; refer specifically to
ERISA plans and apply solely to them; or interfere with the calculation
of benefits owed to an employee. State regulations which have an indirect
affect on ERISA plans-that is, regulations which are of general
applicability and which have tenuous, remote and peripheral economic and
administrative affects on ERISA plans-are not preempted. In reality,
these are little more than labels applied by courts groping their way
through the ERISA preemption analysis. However, ERISA provides one
important limitation to the scope of its own preemption: the savings
clause.
2. THE SAVINGS CLAUSE
The second step in ERISA preemption analysis is application of the
savings clause. Section 514(b)(2)(A) saves from preemption any state law
regulating insurance.75 A law that relates to insurance is not preempted,
even though that insurance is used by an ERISA plan.76 Thus in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,77 the Supreme Court
found that ERISA did not preempt a Massachusetts statute requiring that
minimum mental health care benefits be provided to employees through
insurance sold in the state.78 Because the law regulated insurance, it was
saved from otherwise certain preemption by section 514(b)(2)(A).79
The savings clause saves from ERISA preemption a host of
traditional state regulations governing the sale of insurance within the
73. Id. at 837.
74. Id. at 842 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
75. ERISA § 514(a)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(2)(A).
76. Id.
77. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
78. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 744.
79. Id. at 739.
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state. For example, as the Court noted in Metropolitan Life, all fifty
states now require that insurance coverage of infants begin at birth, rather
than at some time shortly thereafter, as had been market practice prior to
regulation.' Further, many states require that insurers offer particular
kinds of coverage, or coverage provided by particular types of health care
providers. s' ERISA does not preempt these regulations of insurance
despite relating to ERISA employee benefit plans, because the savings
clause saves them from preemption.
3. THE DEEMER CLAUSE
The third step in the preemption analysis requires application of
ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), the deemer clause.' Section 514(b)(2)(B) states
that self-insured plans cannot be deemed an insurance organization for
purposes of state regulation.' In other words, any law preempted by
ERISA, but preserved by the savings clause as regulating insurance, is
nonetheless preempted as applied to self-insured plans. Thus the statute
at issue in Metropolitan Life was saved from preemption as applied to
employee benefit plans that purchased insurance, but was again preempted
as applied to self-funded plans because those plans could not be deemed
insurance. 4 As the Court acknowledged, this interpretation "results in
a distinction between insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former
open to indirect regulation while the latter are not."8 5 However, the
Court has justified that interpretation as merely giving life to a distinction
created by Congress in section 514(b)(2)(B), "a distinction Congress is
aware of and one it has chosen not to alter."86
In FMC Corp. v. Holliday,87 the Supreme Court ruled that ERISA
preempted a Pennsylvania anti-subrogation law8 as it applied to self-
insured employee health benefit plans, but not as it applied to contract-
80. Id. at 729 (citing Appellate Brief for American Public Health Association et
al. as Amici Curiae (listing state statutes)).
81. Id.
82. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
83. Id.
84. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1785, a 1977 Activity Report of the House
Committee on Education and Labor that recognized the difference in treatment between
insured and self-insured plans).
87. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
88. Section 1720 of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law,
75 PA. CONST. STAT. § 1720 (1987), prohibited employee benefit plans, as well as other
insurance arrangements, from collecting reimbursement of health care expenses paid out
by the plan to participants who had subsequently recovered damages in tort.
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insured plans. s9 The Court acknowledged the odd distinction drawn
between the regulation of contract-insured and self-insured plans, but held
that the deemer clause mandated it: "Our interpretation of the deemer
clause makes clear that if a plan is insured, a State may regulate it
indirectly through regulation of its insurer and its insurer's insurance
contracts; if the plan is uninsured, the State may not regulate it."'
Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued that the Court's interpretation of
ERISA drew "a broad and illogical distinction between benefit plans that
are funded by the employer (self-insured plans) and those that are insured
by regulated insurance companies (insured plans)."91 Justice Stevens
reminded the Court that from the standpoint of plan participants, who are
intended to be the prime beneficiaries of ERISA, there is "no apparent
reason" for drawing such a distinction.' Further, according to Stevens,
such an interpretation would undermine the congressional intent in passing
ERISA of providing uniformity in employee benefit laws.'
Justice Stevens also argued that applying the deemer clause and
savings clause was unnecessary because the Court should not have found
that the anti-subrogation statute related to an employee benefit plan at
all.' He argued that the anti-subrogation statute was not unambiguously
the kind of law Congress intended to preempt with respect to employee
benefit plans, and that where there was ambiguity regarding a statutory
preemption of state law, the Court should apply a strong presumption
against preemption.9" Applying that presumption, Stevens first found
that Congress did not intend to preempt Pennsylvania's anti-subrogation
statute as applied to ERISA plans. Second, even if it did, it certainly did
not intend to "pre-empt enforcement of that statute against self-insured
plans while preserving enforcement against insured plans."'
89. FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 65.
90. Id. at 64.
91. Id. at 65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 67 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency
& Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988)).
96. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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III. RECENT CASES THAT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY FOR STATE ACTION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF PLAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVENT OF PLAN
FAILURE
A. Failures of the Past
As demonstrated in Shaw, Metropolitan Life, and Holliday,
ERISA preemption can undo state laws aimed at various aspects of health
care reform. State attempts to reform health care have been turned back
either by ERISA preemption generally, or-for state laws that regulate
insurance and are thus saved by the savings clause-by the deemer
clause's preemption of those laws as applied to self-insured plans.
For example, in St. Paul Electrical Workers Welfare Fund v.
Markman,97 self-insurers successfully challenged the application of
certain provisions of the Minnesota Comprehensive Health Insurance Act
to their plans.9" Among its several provisions, the Act created
substantive and reporting mandates for insurers. Self-insurers argued that
the Act subjected them to both substantive aid reporting requirements of
state insurance laws, and was thus preempted by the deemer clause.'
The court agreed, and permanently enjoined the state from enforcing the
Act's requirements against self-insured plans."°
Similarly, in General Split Corp. v. Mitchell,"°' the court held that
ERISA preempted the provisions of a Wisconsin law as applied to self-
insured ERISA plans. The provisions mandated certain conversion
benefits for health insurance plans and established the Wisconsin Health
Insurance Risk Sharing Plan (HIRSP), a program that provides health
insurance to individuals whose physical or mental conditions prevent them
from obtaining private market health insurance."° Relying largely on
St. Paul Electrical Workers, the court held that the law mandating
conversion benefits related to ERISA plans, but was saved from
preemption as applied to insurance contract plans through the savings
clause.'0 3 However, the court found that the deemer clause preempted
state imposition of substantive provisions on self-insured ERISA
plans." Further, the court held that the provision mandating tax
assessments for contribution to the HIRSP fund, which otherwise would
97. 490 F. Supp. 931 (D. Minn. 1980).
98. St. Paul Elec. Workers, 490 F. Supp. at 934.
99. Id. at 933.
100. Id. at 934.
101. 523 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
102. Mitchell, 523 F. Supp. at 430.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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have been preempted by ERISA for relating to an employee benefit plan,
was not preempted as applied to insurance contract plans because of the
savings clause. 5 Nevertheless, it was preempted as applied to self-
insured plans because of the deemer clause." The state argued that
even if it could not tax the self-insured plans themselves, it could tax the
sale of stop-loss insurance to them under traditional insurance regulation
powers. But this argument was rejected.0 7 The court observed that the
state did not assess the tax on the stop-loss premium paid by the plans,
but rather on the level of benefits the plans themselves paid out to
participants.0 " Therefore, the court concluded that the tax applied to
the plans themselves and not to the sale of stop-loss insurance to the
plans. 'o
B. United Wire
In United Wire, Metal and Machine Health and Welfare Fund v.
Morristown Memorial Hospital,"° the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that ERISA did not preempt a New Jersey
statute"' that forced self-insured plans to pay hospital use
surcharges." 2 The surcharges were used by the state to pay the costs
of indigent care and bad debts, state medicare subsidies, as well as to
reimburse hospitals for discounts given to other types of plans." 3 The
district court had held that ERISA preempted the statute.14 It reasoned
that the statute would subject ERISA plans to administrative costs, and
force them to pay hospital costs for non-participants in their plans." 5
Therefore, the statute related to the plans, triggering preemption." 6
The Court of Appeals disagreed." 7
The court first noted the breadth of ERISA's preemption. The
court explained that a law relates to an ERISA plan "if it is specifically
designed to affect employee benefit plans, if it singles out such plans for
105. Id.
106. Id at 431.
107. Mitchell, 523 F. Supp. at 431.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993).
111. N.J. STAT..ANN. § 26:2H-1 (repealed 1993).
112. United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1189.
113. Id. at 1196.
114. United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health and Welfare Fund v. Morristown
Memorial Hosp., 793 F. Supp. 524, 537 (D.N.J. 1992).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1196.
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special treatment, or if the rights or restrictions it creates are predicated
on the existence of such a plan."" 8 Further, ERISA may preempt a
state law even though there is no "direct nexus" with ERISA plans,
provided the effect of the state law is to restrict the options of ERISA
plans in their choice of benefits, structure, reporting and administration,
or if such laws would impair the ability of an ERISA plan to function
simultaneously in more than one state. "9
Despite the breadth of ERISA preemption, the court upheld the New
Jersey law. The court noted the state law in question was one of general
applicability, did not single out ERISA plans for special treatment, and
functioned regardless of the existence of ERISA plans. Moreover, the
effect of the law-an increase in the costs of hospital use-was no
different from any number of state regulations that increased the costs of
hospital use, such as utility costs, employee wages, and waste disposal
costs."2 The court considered the surcharges a function of the state
police power to control the price of certain services and commodities,
such as public utilities, minimum wages, and rent control.' 2' The court
held that the Congress could not have intended indirect economic
influence of such regulations on plan costs to trigger ERISA's preemption
clause.' 2 The statute was not intended to regulate the affairs of ERISA
plans."z' It did not single out ERISA plans for special treatment, nor
did it predicate rights or obligations on the existence of such plans."
The statute did not dictate or restrict either the structure of ERISA plans
or the conduct of their affairs.", It did not impair the ability of such
a plan to operate simultaneously in more than one state." Finally, the
statute had only an indirect economic influence on the plans, not unlike
118. Id. at 1192 (citing District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade,
506 U.S. 125 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); Mackey
v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988); McCoy v.
Massachusetts Inst. of Technology, 950 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1991); Bricklayers Local 33 v.
America's Marble Source, 950 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1991); McMahon v. McDowell 794
F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 971 (1986)).
119. United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1193 (citing FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52
(1990); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981); Hampton Indus., Inc.
v. Sparrow, 981 F.2d 726 (4th Cir. 1992); Nat'l Elevator Indus., Inc. v. Calhoun, 957
F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1992); Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hospital,
947 F.2d 1341 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957 (1992); Michigan Carpenters




123. Id. at 1195.
124. United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1195.
125. Id. at 1179.
126. Id.
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any number of other factors that increase the costs of doing business.127
Therefore, the statute did not relate to the plans strongly enough to trigger
preemption. "
The court noted that this ruling squarely conflicted with a recent
decision of the Southern District of New York. In Travelers Insurance
Co. v. Cuomo,' the New York court had found that a nearly identical
New York statute mandating hospital surcharges for certain types of
insurers was preempted as applied to ERISA-covered employee benefit
plans. The Supreme Court eventually resolved the conflict in Travelers
Insurance Co. v. Pataki (Travelers I). 130
C. Travelers I
In Travelers I, the Supreme Court limited the scope of ERISA
preemption by unanimously holding that ERISA did not preempt a New
York statute requiring hospitals to collect surcharges from patients
covered by commercial insurers, but not from patients insured by Blue
Cross/Blue Shield.1 3' The insurers had claimed that the statute "related
to" employee benefit plans and was therefore preempted by ERISA.
31
The Court applied the Shaw related to test to the New York statute.
It reasoned that in determining whether the statute had a "connection
with" an ERISA plan, it would look to ERISA's objectives as a guide to
what Congress intended to preempt. 33 The Court then reasoned that
ERISA preempted state laws that mandated employee benefit structures
or their administration, as well as laws that provided alternate ERISA
enforcement mechanisms." The surcharges did not fall within those
categories.' 35 New York intended the surcharges only to make Blue
Cross/Blue Shield more attractive than other commercial insurers,
because, unlike the latter, Blue Cross helped the state provide insurance
to people who could not otherwise afford or obtain it." The Court was
undeterred by the fact that the statute created cost discrepancies between
different types of insurance because it found that cost uniformity was not
127. Id. at 1196.
128. Id.
129. 813 F. Supp 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
130. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
131. Travelersl, 115 S. Ct. at 1683; see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2807,
2807-c(l)(b), 2807-c(1)(a) (McKinney 1993).
132. Travelers 1, 115 S. Ct. at 1675.
133. Id. at 1677.
134. Id. at 1680.
135. Id. at 1679.
136. Id. at 1678.
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an objective of ERISA.' 37 Moreover, echoing United Wire, the Court
reasoned that the indirect economic effect of the surcharges in increasing
plan costs was not unlike many other costs of state regulation faced by
insurers, such as quality control standards and workplace regulation,
which do not trigger preemption. 3 ' Hence, the Court concluded that
both the purpose and effect of the New York statute did not directly relate
to the objectives of ERISA, and was thus not preempted by it.'39
Indeed, the Supreme Court's reading of the preemption clause in
Travelers I revealed even more tolerance for state regulation than the
Third Circuit in United Wire. For example, while United Wire
emphasized that the surcharge statute in question was of general
applicability and did not single out ERISA plans for special treatment,
Travelers I made no mention of those considerations. In fact, the
surcharge statute at issue in Travelers I was not of general applicability
because it applied only to some employee benefit plan participants'
hospital usage (including ERISA self-funded plan members) and not
others. The Court made clear that ERISA does not preempt only direct
regulation of ERISA plans. It noted that "a state law might produce such
acute, albeit indirect, economic effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force
an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or
effectively restrict its choice of insurers, and that such a state law might
indeed be pre-empted.""' But the New York statute did not have that
effect; it affected "only indirectly the relative prices of insurance policies,
a result no different from myriad state laws in areas traditionally subject
to local regulation, which Congress could not possibly have intended to
eliminate." 4'
In other words, laws which indirectly affect the relative prices of
ERISA-covered insurance plans, but which do not impact those plans by
regulating the terms or administration of them, do not relate to those
plans strongly enough to trigger preemption. Because those state laws do
not "relate to" employee benefit plans strongly enough to trigger
preemption, it would seem that neither the savings clause nor the deemer
clause applies. However, the Court did not consider whether the
surcharge was preempted as applied to self-insured plans."4 Instead,
it remanded the question to the court of appeals, which had not expressly
addressed the preemption of surcharges on self-insured plans. 43
137. Travelers 1, 115 S. Ct. at 1678.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1683.
141. Id. at 1683.
142. Travelers1, 115 S. Ct. at 1675 n.4.
143. Id.
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D. Travelers II, on remand
On remand, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that ERISA
did not preempt the surcharges as applied to self-insured plans.1" As
the court of appeals read "ERISA's Delphic preemption provision, "145
a plan's self-insured status is relevant for purposes of applying the deemer
clause when a statute relating to an employee benefit plan has been spared
preemption by the savings clause.1" Because the Supreme Court had
held that the New York statute did not relate to ERISA plans generally,
it could not "nevertheless, -still relate to self-insured plans
specifically. " 147  The court reasoned that the indirect effect of the
surcharge on self-insured plans is the same as the effect on other ERISA
plans; if the effect does not trigger preemption for other ERISA plans, it
cannot do so for self-insured plans.'" Like the surcharges on other
plans, the surcharges on self-insured plans do "'not bind plan
administrators to any particular choice.'"' 49 Relying on the Supreme
Court decision in Travelers I, the court of appeals thus held that New
York may assess surcharges on hospital use by members of ERISA self-
insured employee health benefit plans." 5
E. Safeco v. Musser
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently
held that Wisconsin may levy taxes on the sale of stop-loss insurance to
otherwise self-insured ERISA plans without triggering preemption.,'
Wisconsin uses the taxes collected from health insurers to fund the
HIRSP. 52 The plaintiff insurance companies claimed that the statute,
which concededly regulated insurance, was saved as applied to contract-
insurance plans, but was preempted by the deemer clause as applied to the
sale of stop-loss insurance to otherwise self-insured plans. 53  The
Seventh Circuit postponed its decision pending the Supreme Court's
144. Travelers II, 63 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1995).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. (emphasis deleted).
148. Id.
149. Travelers 11, 63 F.3d at 94 (quoting Travelers 1, 115 S. Ct. at 1679).
150. Id. at 94-95.
151. Safeco Life Ins. Co. v. Musser, 65 F.3d 647, 648 (7th Cir. 1995).
152. Id.; see also General Split Corp. v. Mitchell, 523 F. Supp. 427, 429 (E.D.
Wis. 1981). ,i
153. Safeco, 65 F.3d at 650.
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decision in Travelers I. Relying on the Travelers I and 11 decisions,
the Seventh Circuit disagreed.'55
The court held that the HIRSP assessments did not relate to ERISA
plans within the meaning of ERISA's preemption doctrine.' Like the
surcharges at issue in Travelers I and II, the HIRSP assessments were
held to have an indirect influence on the plans, because they did not bind
plan administrators to any particular choice. 5 " Like the surcharges, the
assessments impacted the plans through increased costs without attempting
to mandate what benefits were offered or how they were administered:
"[b]ecause the HISRP assessments imposed by Wisconsin on health
insurance carriers do not interfere with the provisions or administration
of ERISA plans, the assessments do not relate to such plans in a manner
significant enough to implicate the preemption clause of the statute."1
51
Thus there was no need to undergo the second and third stages of the
preemption analysis.'" Further, unlike the assessments at issue in
Mitchell, these assessments were based on the sale of the stop-loss
insurance, not on the level of benefits paid out by the individual
plans. '"
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM TO PROTECT SELF-INSURED PLAN
PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVENT OF PLAN FAILURE
A. Possibilities for Federal Reform
The most logical way to reform the preemption effects of a federal
statute such as ERISA is to amend the statute itself. Recently, the Clinton
Administration's Health Security Act of 1993 attempted to reform ERISA
so as to protect self-insured plan participants and health care providers in
the event of plan failure. The proposed Act mandated minimum funding
requirements for self-insured employee welfare plans.' 6' It also
154. Id. at 651 n.3.
155. Id. at 653.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Safeco, 65 F.3d at 653.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Self-funded health plans would have been required to maintain a trust fund
at a level equal to the estimated amount owed to health care providers. The trust fund
would have been protected by special status in bankruptcy proceedings in the event of
employer failure. The Department of Labor would have overseen a national guaranty
fund for self-insured health plans to provide financial protection for participants and health
care providers in the event of plan failure. As previously noted, because states have been
unable to assess self-insured plans for contribution to state insurance guaranty funds, most
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established a national employee welfare benefit guaranty corporation to
insure that self-insured plan participants would be able to cover
outstanding health care bills if and when plans failed.162 These reforms
would have provided significant protection for self-insured plan
participants in the event of plan failure." But Congress failed to pass
the Act.' Despite Congress' increased interest in shifting power from
the federal government to state governments, it has shown little interest
in reforming or removing ERISA's preemption power." As increasing
numbers of businesses offer self-insured plans free from state regulation,
it seems less likely that federal reform will emerge easily or quickly.
Therefore, in the absence of federal reform, states should act within the
permissible bounds of ERISA preemption to protect self-insured plan
participants faced with outstanding health care bills arising from plan
failure.
B. Possibilities.for State Reform
Like many states, Wisconsin has an insurance guaranty fund to
protect insurance plan participants in the event of plan failure.'" The
state finances the insurance guaranty fund by assessing taxes on insurance
company plans.167 However, because self-insured plans have not been
assessed for taxes to contribute to those funds (because they are
preempted by ERISA's deemer clause), self-insured plan participants are
not included in the guaranty fund's protection.'68
However, under the Travelers and Safeco decisions, it may be
possible for Wisconsin, as well as other states, to indirectly assess all
employee health benefit plans, including self-insured, for contribution to
state insurance guaranty funds. The state could levy taxes on the sale of
stop-loss insurance and impose hospital use surcharges without triggering
ERISA's preemption clause. A direct tax on self-insured plans based on
their level of income would still almost certainly trigger ERISA
self-insured plan participants are not included in the protection of those funds. See THE
WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, THE PRESIDENT'S HEALTH SECURITY PLAN:
THE CLINTON BLUEPRINT 79-80 (1993); see also supra part lII.A.
162. WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 162, at 79-80.
163. Id.
164. See J. Geisel, Reforms Doomedfom Start, BUS. INS., Dec. 26, 1994, at 32.
165. See James E. Holloway, ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive Federal
Health Care: A Call for "Cooperative Federalism" to Preserve the States' Role in
Formulating Health Care Policy, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 405, 406-08, 454-55 (1994).
166. WIS. STAT. § 646 (1995-1996).
167. WIS. STAT. § 646.51. Such taxes would be preempted by ERISA, but are
saved by the savings clause.
168. WIS. STAT. § 646.01(b)(9).
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preemption, as it did in Mitchell. However, generally applicable
surcharges on hospital use and assessments on the sale of stop-loss
insurance would have the same indirect economic influence on the plans
as those allowed under Travelers I and I1, United Wire, and Safeco.
Although such surcharges and assessments might result in slight price
discrepancies between self-insured and contract-insured plans, the
Supreme Court noted in Travelers I that price uniformity is not an object
of ERISA.I" Price discrepancies are unlikely, however, because
contract-insured plans already must contribute to the guaranty funds
through taxes; in fact, the result might be price equalization. Any
argument that self-insured plans were being singled out for extra burdens
would seem specious in light of the special privileges such plans currently
enjoy.
ERISA self-insured health benefit plans have a clear competitive
advantage over insurance contract plans, because self-insured plans have
been able to avoid assessments such as contributions to state insurance
guaranty funds and HIRSP, as well as minimum funding requirements.
Indeed, this is one reason for the rapidly growing popularity of self-
funded plans among employers. Travelers, United Wire and Safeco may
be understood as an attempt to correct this unintended health care market
advantage. The state interest in a competitive and safe heqth care market
should encourage reformers to explore the possibility of assessing self-
funded health care plans for contribution to state insurance guaranty
funds.
Unlike the assessments levied on the sale of stop-loss insurance
allowed in Safeco, those proposed here would use the collected revenues
to contribute to the state insurance guaranty fund rather than to purchase
insurance for those cannot obtain it in the private market (e.g., HIRSP).
Beyond that, the assessments and surcharges proposed here are notably
similar to the ones allowed in United Wire, Travelers, and Safeco. Like
them, the surcharges and assessments suggested here would have almost
no influence on the provisions or administration of the plans. Unlike the
statute mandating disability benefits for pregnant employees preempted in
Shaw, for example, these taxes and surcharges would not determine the
substantive provisions of plans.
For preemption purposes, what the state does with the revenues
collected from assessments on the sale of stop-loss insurance should be
irrelevant. Assessments on the sale of stop-loss insurance collected to
benefit the state insurance guaranty fund do not relate to self-funded plans
more directly than assessments collected to benefit insurance programs for
people who cannot obtain it in the private market. As long as the
169. Travelers1, 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1680 (1995).
370
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surcharges and assessments proposed here have a similarly indirect impact
on the plans (i.e, they do not directly affect the administration or
substantive choices of the plans) they will not relate to those plans, and
thus like the surcharges and assessments allowed in Travelers, United
Wire and Safeco, should not trigger ERISA preemption. Self-insured plans
would no longer be able to avoid contributing to state insurance guaranty
funds.
Of course some allowance would have to be made for distinctions
among self-insured plans. Self-insured plans that do not purchase stop-
loss insurance could be assessed entirely through surcharges on hospital
use, while plans that do purchase stop-loss insurance could be assessed
either entirely through taxes on the sale of the stop-loss insurance, or
through a combination of taxes on that sale and surcharges on hospital
use. One unintended effect of taxing the sale of stop-loss insurance may
be to reduce the number of plans that purchase it. However, revenue for
the state insurance guaranty fund lost through a reduction in the purchase
of stop-loss insurance could be made up by hospital use surcharges.
Thus, contributions to the state insurance guaranty fund might be
maintained despite the reduction in the purchase of stop-loss insurance.
Further, while stop-loss insurance provides some protection for plan
participants in the event of plan failure, it is neither necessarily adequate
nor uniform. An employer may purchase stop-loss insurance at any level
she desires, and may tailor the plan to suit particular needs. Thus stop-
loss insurance plans differ from employer to employer in regard to the
amount of protection they provide. In contrast, protection through the
state insurance guaranty fund is adequate to cover outstanding bills
regardless of employer preferences. Therefore plan participants face less
risk when protected by the state insurance guaranty fund than by stop-loss
insurance. Even if some plans decide to forgo stop-loss insurance in
response to taxes on its sale, the alternate surcharge mechanism would
provide satisfactory protection through contributions to the state insurance
dguaranty fund. Furthermore, assessments could be structured to create
incentives for plans to purchase stop-loss insurance by assessing more
through hospital use surcharges than through taxes on the sale of stop-loss
insurance.
Another more serious unintended effect of the surcharges and taxes
proposed here might be to reduce the number of employers who offer
their employees health insurance plans at all. However, the number of
employers driven from offering health insurance because of these
surcharges and taxes is unlikely to be significant for at least two reasons.
First, employers can pass along the slight increase in insurance costs
directly to the employees. As the United Wire, Travelers and Safeco
courts carefully noted, these assessments do not create extra
administrative burdens for the employer. Although employees might have
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to pay slightly more, they would be purchasing protection they do not
now enjoy. Secondly, most Americans who have health insurance receive
it through their employer. In order for an employer to remain attractive
to employees, she may be willing to pay the slightly higher costs of
providing insurance.
In addition, the value to participants of an unsafe plan may not be
much greater than the value of no plan at all. Participants in unsafe plans
are probably unaware of the plan's financial status, and thus do not know
that they should seek insurance coverage elsewhere. While this proposal
might drive some plans from the market, all remaining plans would be
guaranteed. Thus although some employees may no longer be able to
obtain insurance from their employers, all who do, as well as everyone
else who obtains insurance through other sources would at least be
protected in the event of plan failure.
If enacted, the taxes and surcharges proposed here would almost
certainly result in litigation. ERISA preemption analysis is complex,
unclear, and in flux. Given the complexity and uncertainty of ERISA
preemption analysis, states might be unwilling to explore the possibilities
offered by the Travelers, United Wire and Safeco decisions. Furthermore,
levying new taxes and surcharges has no political appeal. However,
states have long been frustrated by the ability of self-funded plans to
escape legitimate state regulation because of federal ERISA preemption.
Framed by the rhetoric of federalism and the state's legitimate interest in
providing its citizens with a competitive and safe health care market-a
task Congress originally intended ERISA to accomplish-the specter of
new taxes and surcharges is much less politically daunting. Indeed state
judiciaries have long noted the "inconsistency [of enforcing ERISA
preemption] with pious rhetoric emanating from Washington about
returning government to the people at state and local levels."" 7
Some states have already begun to indicate a willingness to examine
the new possibilities offered by Travelers and Safeco. For example, the
Wisconsin Office of the Insurance Commissioner recently urged the state
legislature to reconsider funding mechanisms for HIRSP in light of these
decisions: "[Tihe Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals have signaled a new willingness to broaden state authority in this
area. The lack of clarity should encourage you to thoroughly explore the
possibilities now afforded the state to take advantage of this trend."17
170. Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 764 P.2d 1059, 1069 (Cal.
1988) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
171. Testimony Relating to the Health Insurance Risk-Sharing Plan before the
Senate Insurance Committee and Assembly Committee on Insurance, Securities, and
Corporate Policy offered on behalf of Commissioner of Insurance Josephine W. Musser
by Peter C. Farrow, Insurance Administrator (Oct. 19, 1995).
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As the Office cautioned, "a direct assessment on self-funded health plans
would be preempted and this preemption could not be avoided by simply
removing any references to health plans from the language of the
statute."" Nevertheless, the Office advised the legislature that "the
Travelers and Safeco decisions illustrate how states may indirectly affect
health plans without fear of preemption."" 3
Surcharges on hospital use and assessments on the sale of stop-loss
insurance should survive ERISA's preemption. They would also be
equitable. A properly designed funding mechanism would protect self-
insured plan participants without imposing external costs on Wisconsin
taxpayers. It would do so by setting the contribution to the state
insurance guaranty fund through hospital use surcharges and taxes on the
sale of stop-loss insurance equal to the potential need of self-insured plan
participants for protection. Thus, two unfair situations would be avoided:
the failure of a self-insured plan would not suddenly burden plan
participants with outstanding health care bills; and the protection of such
plan participants generally would not be subsidized by taxpayers. Instead,
through surcharges and assessments now allowed without triggering
ERISA preemption, self-insured plans and their participants would fund
their own protection.
V. CONCLUSION
Employees who receive health benefits through ERISA self-insured
plans need protection when self-insured plans fail. Because of the breadth
of ERISA preemption, states have been unable to assess ERISA self-
insured plans for contribution to state insurance guaranty funds, and thus
have been unable to include those employees in the protection of those
funds. Further, attempts at federal reform to protect these employees
have failed to garner support. However, under the recent Travelers,
United Wire, and Safeco decisions, it may be possible for states to assess
ERISA self-insured funds and their participants through a combination of
hospital use surcharges and taxes on the sale of stop-loss insurance for
contribution to state insurance guaranty funds. Contributions to the state
insurance guaranty fund from self-insured plans and their participants
would protect employees who receive health benefits through ERISA self-
insured plans from plan failure. States should explore ways of drawing
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